Board Interlocks and Their Impact on Corporate Governance: The Indian Experience - Coping with Corporate Cholesterol by Balasubramanian, Bala N. et al.
 
   2 
 
 
About IIM Bangalore 
 
Established in 1973, the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore (IIMB) today offers a range of post-
graduate  and  doctoral  level  courses  as  well  as  executive  education  programmes.  IIMB  Centres  of 
Excellence  are  engaged  in  adding  value  to  their  communities  in  the  areas  of   Public  Policy,  Capital 
Markets & Financial Management, Corporate Governance,  Entrepreneurship, Public Policy, Software 
and  Supply  Chain  Management,  to  name  a  few.  In  June  2010  IIMB  obtained  the  European  Quality 
Improvement  System  (EQUIS)  accreditation  awarded  by  the  European  Foundation  for  Management 
Development (EFMD). With a faculty body from amongst the best universities worldwide, IIMB is  a 
leader in the area of management research, education and consulting. 
 
More information on IIMB is available at www.iimb.ernet.in  or www.iimb.ac.in   
 
Introducing the IIMB Centre for Corporate Governance and Citizenship 
 
The  Centre  for  Corporate  Governance  and  Citizenship  (CCGC)  at  the  Indian  Institute 
Management Bangalore was inaugurated in 2003, by Judge Mervyn King of South Africa, one of 
the  leading  world  authorities  on  Ethics  and  Governance.  The  Centre  brings  under  a  single 
umbrella the multidisciplinary contributions of various faculties to improve the understanding 
of  Governance,  which  encompasses  Ethics  and  all  aspects  of  Responsible  Business  and 
sustainability. The Centre also provides policy support to the Government, encouraging debate 
and dissemination of information and engaging in ongoing research on contemporary topics. It 
covers academia, Industry and also extends its sphere of influence to the not-for-profit sector. 
The Centre was among the first to be accredited as a National Centre of Excellence by the 
National Foundation for Corporate Governance, sponsored by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 
and, through its association with national and international academic institutions and industry 
chambers, has played a leading role in the enhancement of corporate governance standards in 
the country.  
 
The  unique  combination  of  governance,  ethics  and  responsibility  makes  the  Centre  an 
appropriate destination for the confluence of these different dimensions of good corporate 
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Abstract 
Board interlocks occur when a director of one organization sits on the board of directors of 
another organization. The causes and consequences of these interlocks have been much debated 
in the western literature but comparatively little is known about interlocks in Indian corporate 
boards. Board interlocks are essentially analogous to cholesterol. Both are facts of life. Like 
good cholesterol, there are aspects of interlocking directorates that are beneficial and there are 
others that are detrimental to the corporation and its stakeholders and their respective interests.  
In this study, we find that board interlocks are quite widespread in India. Taking a (numerically) 
small but nevertheless (in terms of market capitalization) an important slice of available 
corporate data, we observed that in 2010, „highly boarded‟
1 directors (defined as those on the 
board of 5 or more listed NSE companies) who constitute just 6 percent of the overall pool of 
directors among NSE100 companies are associated with 486 NSE listed companies which 
account for a whopping 66 percent of the total market capitalization of all NSE listed companies. 
Interestingly, there appears to be a marked increase in market capitalization of these „highly 
boarded‟ companies, which these „highly boarded‟ directors are linked to over the last several 
years. For instance, for the 3 years from 2001 to 2003, the market capitalization of „highly 
boarded‟ companies ranged between 33 percent to 43 percent; it moved up to peak of 70 percent 
in 2007 and was at 66 percent in 2010 (the latest year in the study period). The substantive rise in 
market capitalization of these „highly boarded‟ companies has coincided with only a marginal 
increase (from 5% to 6%) in the proportion of „highly boarded‟ directorships.  
These trends suggest that despite the well-intentioned regulatory reforms (a) the extent of over-
boarding/interlocking among directors has not come down (there is actually a marginal increase) 
and (b) there appears to be increasing concentration of power among key individuals. Given the 
general view that concentration of power in a few individuals or entities is not desirable in the 
larger interests of society, it would appear that the observed trends in the concentration of power 
among  a  handful  of  the  country‟s  corporate  elite  is  a  matter  for  substantive  public  policy 
concern. Finally, the regression analysis indicates a positive impact on Return on Assets (ROA) 
for „highly boarded‟ directors signifying a negation of the agency centric conceptualization on 
the role of multiple directors. Instead, connectedness variables (Eigen vector) which proxy for 
the Resource dependency hypothesis are quite strongly supported. In a nutshell, from public 
policy perspective, the analysis potentially reflects the „bad cholesterol‟ elements of multiple 
directorships in terms of a tiny segment of „highly boarded‟ directors controlling a significant 
portion  of  the  country‟s  economic  prowess,  whereas  the  positive  influences  on  company 




                                                            
1 „Highly boarded‟ directors can also be referred to as „Highly networked‟ directors. We have chosen to stick to 
„Highly boarded‟ directors and „Boardedness‟ as the operational measure as the literature has generally focused on 




Board interlocks and corporate elites are an engaging  field of ongoing academic and policy 
research around the world, especially because of the concentration of economic power in few 
individuals  or  entities  to  the  possible  detriment  of  the  society  at  large.  With  India  moving 
towards a global economic power status and the Indian business sector increasingly growing in 
importance  both  in  terms  of  its  contribution  to  the  national  product  and  to  the  country‟s 
globalization initiatives, such concentration does portend influential impact on the economic and 
political  scene  in  the  country.  This  study  documents  the  origins,  development  and  potential 
impact of these developments and also presents preliminary findings of the nature, extent and 
implications of the increasing power of the corporate elites over the first decade of the current 
century. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 recapitulates the origins of interlocking directorates 
over the decades (and centuries!) internationally and in India;
2 Section 2 offers a brief summary 
of the literature in this field of research; Section 3 deals with the network methodology followed 
in the analysis and discuss the network analysis; Section 4 describes the composition of the study 
sample; Section 5 describes the regression analysis, Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and 
Section 7 proposes a  future research agenda in this area. 
                                                            
2Some parts of Section 1 and 2 draw upon the earlier work of one of the co-authors and published in Corporate 
Governance and Stewardship (2010), Tata McGraw-Hill 7 
 
1 
A Brief History of Interlocking Directorates 
 
The phenomenon of common directors in different business entities appears to be as old as the 
advent of the corporate format of organizations itself. For example, such interlocking directorates 
have been identified in British companies operating in their erstwhile colonies and dominions as 
early  as  at  the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century:  Using  data  relating  to  twelve  transnationals 
(including such iconic names as Barclays Bank, Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 
Hudson Bay Company, and P & O) during 1899–1900 and 1829–1830, researchers have noted 
713 interlocks in the later year compared to 333 in the former, in a variety of business segments. 
Legendary names like Lord Inchcape, Lord Brabourne, the Earl of Lichfield and Sir Thomas 
Sutherland,  figure  in  these  interlocks.  The  cohesive  content  of  these  corporate  elites  was 
protected by their common lineage and heritage as landowners, businessmen and professionals, 
with  similar  schooling  and  social  ties,  often  cemented  by  intra-marriages  within  the  groups 
(Brayshay, et al, 2005). In the United States, both as a result of integrated ownership and control 
of all manufacturing and marketing input materials and services under one roof and the evolution 
of the money trust concept of investment banking owning and controlling vast business empires 
enabled by the acceptance of the holding corporation principle (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 
2003), board interlocks had developed so strongly apparently to the detriment of free trade and 
competition in the closing years of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth that they became 
the subject of  serious and successful muckraking
3(Tarbell,1904), scathing criticism (Brandeis, 
                                                            
3 Eventually leading to the breakup of Standard Oil in to the forerunners of Exxon, Amoco, Mobil and Chevron 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2003, p. 73) 8 
 
1913)and  regulatory  investigation
4  (Pujo, 1912).  With the banking systems largely funding 
corporate development in Germany and Japan, their representatives were a natural  choice for 
board positions of the investee companies, a phenomenon that encouraged  similar interlocks in 
those countries. In socialist-communist ideology countries like the erstwhile Soviet Union, its 
East-European dependencies and China, party and state functionaries often found themselves on 
the boards of their state-owned enterprises, thus again leading to significant interlocks. 
 
In India, board interlocking received substantial  fillip in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
with the operation of Managing Agencies controlling several entities concurrently and with seats 
on their respective boards.  The largest number of managed companies by a single managing 
agency (Bird & Co) reportedly, was 40. The 17 largest managing agencies managed in all 350 
companies with an aggregate paid up capital of Rs 1140 million, or 25% of the total paid up 
capital of all companies managed by agencies. Ten of these managing agencies were public 
companies, the rest were private limited companies. It  is interesting also to note that while the 
British entity Bird & Co topped the list with 40 managed companies in terms of numbers, it was 
two Indian managing agencies (Tata Industries Ltd and Birla Bros. Ltd) that led the field in terms 
of aggregate paid up capital of managed companies.
5 Such a conglomeration of corporate entities 
naturally demanded the involvement of key personnel from the managing agency house on their 
boards both for reasons of control and of reputational impact on investors and custome rs and 
arguably paved the way for the smooth transition and continuation of such practices in the Indian 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
4 The Commttee‟s recommendations eventually led to the Clayton Antitrust Act  in 1914 that restricted interlocking 
directorships when they restrained trade (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2003, p. 74) 
 
5  These statistics are from The Managing Agency System: A Review of Its Working and Prospects of Its Future, pp. 
38–41. As a matter of interest, out of the total of 3944 agencies in active operation, 2522 were unincorporated 
entities such as partnerships, 1238 were private limited companies, and the remaining 184 were incorporated as 
public limited companies. 9 
 
corporate sector long after the managing agencies themselves were abolished in the latter half of 
the twentieth century (Bala, 2010). The fact that over ninety percent of Indian listed companies 
by market capitalization are owned and/or controlled by dominant shareholders with at least 
twenty percent of voting equity further offers a fertile ground for proliferation of interlocked 
boards. 
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2 
A Select Review of Recent Research 
 
Board interlocks research in recent years could be broadly categorized under three distinct even 
if interrelated themes:  the first and obvious line of study concerns the establishment as a fact the 
existence  and  extent  of  such  interlocks;  the  second  line  of  inquiry  seeks  to  explore  the 
determinants  of  interlock  practices;  and  the  third  deals  with  the  implications  both  for  the 
companies and the society of such interlocks. Following is a brief survey of literature in this field 
under these three thematic groups. 
Board Interlocks in Practice 
That board interlocks operate substantively around the world is an established fact. In the US, 
Gerald Davis and colleagues (2003) studied three sample sets of companies and directors as of 
1982, 1990 and 1999, mostly from the Fortune 500 and 1000 companies, using the small world 
analysis methodology
6 and concluded that  “[C]orporate America is overseen by a network of 
individuals  who  to  a  great  extent  know  each  other  or  have  acquaintances  in  common.  On 
average, any two of the 4538 directors of the 516 largest US firms in the largest component in 
1999 could be connected by 4.3 links, and any two of the boards are 3.5 degrees distant..” 
 
                                                            
6  The small world phenomenon was first raised by Kochen and Pool during the nineteen sixties and seventies, and 
was framed as an empirical research question in 1967 by Stanley Milligram, the social psychologist. Effectively, the 
question is: given a set of people, what is the probability that each member is connected to another member via the 
various links? This analytical approach is the foundation for several network theories and is used extensively in 
problems such as networking among a set of directors in a region, or a country, or an industry and so on. See The 
Small World Problem, Psychology Today, 2:  pp. 60–67 
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In  continental  Europe,  the  interlock  scenario  is  even  more  striking.  Thus,  in  2000  (1990 
comparisons in parentheses), the average path length in Germany was 2.9 (2.6), Sweden 3.7 
(3.0), Denmark 3.7 (2.5), Norway 1.8 (4.2), Switzerland 4.0 (2.6), and in The Netherlands 3.3 
(4.0) (Kogut and Belinky, 2008). In the UK, the path length was about 5.6 in case of 2236 
publicly traded companies in 2003 (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). 
 
In Canada, collectively a small group of 16 directors, constituting less than 1% of the total 1689 
directors  sitting  on  boards  comprising  the  S&P/  TSWX  Composite  Index,  sit  on  68  Index 
company boards or 31% of all Index companies, and command a market capitalization of $437 
billion representing capitalization of around 51% of all Index companies (Rowley and Fullbrook, 
2004). They, however, find that this elite group has transferred good practices from within their 
companies to each other, so they see it as a contribution to good governance. 
 
Multiple Directorships as a Facilitator of Board Interlocks 
 
Closely associated with the concept of board interlocks is the issue of over-boarded directors, an 
expression  that  refers  to  directors  who  sit  on  several  boards.  Although  within  increasingly 
stringent corporate legislation and capital market regulations, besides the escalating competitive 
pressures  flowing  from  rapid  globalization  of  business,  the  demands  on  directors‟  time  and 
attention  especially  in  larger  corporations  is  indeed  significant,  the  phenomenon  of  multiple 
directorships especially within the world of corporate elites continues to flourish, in the process 
encouraging board interlocks. Very few countries with developed capital markets and corporate 
sectors have chosen to mandate any broad-brush ceiling on company directorships. Thus, for 
example, neither the 1992 Cadbury Committee nor its successors, the 1998 Hampel Committee 12 
 
and  the  2003  Higgs  Committee  in  the  UK,  thought  it  fit  to  lay  down  ceiling  numbers  for 
individual directorships. Instead, the UK Combined Code, 2008, highlights the need for company 
boards  to  stipulate  the  expected  time  commitment  for  board  service,  and  for  the  new  non-
executive directors to undertake their time availability to meet what is expected of them. In case 
of full time directors however, the code does prescribe that the board should not agree to their 
taking  on  more  than  one  non-executive  directorship  in  a  FTSE  100  company,  or  the 
chairmanship of such a company. As noted earlier, the UK system operates on a “comply or 
explain” principle and therefore there is scope for companies to deviate from these guidelines so 
long as they explain in their annual reports to shareholders the reasons for such non-compliance. 
In the US, the Council of Institutional Investors recommends that companies should establish 
and publish guidelines specifying how many other boards their directors may serve, and that 
those who attend less than 75% of board and committee meetings for two consecutive years 
(without compelling and stated reasons) should not be re-nominated. It is noteworthy that these 
non-binding principles also stipulate that “excused absences (that is, where leave of absence had 
been sought and granted) should not be categorized as attendance.” Executive directors may not 
serve on more than two other boards, while an incumbent CEO may serve only on one other 
board if, and only if, the CEO‟s own company is in the top half of its peer group. Overall, no 
person may serve on more than five for-profit boards. Such salutary counsel should, even while 
promoting improved attention by directors to a limited number of company boards, possibly 
contribute to a movement, however limited, away from avoidable board interlocks. 
 
The Confederation of Indian Industry‟s 1998 (non-binding) Desirable Code had suggested a 
ceiling of ten listed companies (meaning thereby, that a person could be a member of more 13 
 
companies so long they were not listed and the statutory ceiling [then twenty] was not exceeded). 
There are no specific restrictions imposed through the listing agreements either, so the decision 
is entirely left to the judgment of the company and the individual. Corporate legislation in India 
however, prescribes a ceiling of fifteen companies of which an individual could be a director. In 
practice, thanks to several permitted exclusions, this number can be significantly exceeded.
7 
 
Although multiple directorships is a topic that attracts popular attention both internationally and 
in India, leading to calls for mandated ceilings on such numbers, it should be mentioned that the 
gravity of the issue is limited only to a small proportion of directors in their respective countries. 
Thus, in India, in the case of 500 large companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (as 
reported in company annual reports fo r the year 2002 –03),  directors  holding  more  than  10 
directorships  constituted  less  than  10%  of  the  17,115  directorships  held  by  a  total  of  3891 
directors of the sample companies (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008). At lower cut-off levels of more 
than  5  and  3  directorships,  these  numbers  were  29%  and  44%,  respectively.  By  developed 
country standards these are indeed remarkably high. For example, in Australia, among the top 
200  ASX-listed  companies  in  2003,  those  with  more  than  5  and  3  directorships  constituted 
respectively 5.85% and 23.35% of their total 1973 directorships across all listed companies (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2005). In the US, a study of 478 S&P companies filing proxy reports up to 31 
May 2007, supplemented by online responses from 119 corporate secretaries in the first half of 
                                                            
7  Section 275 of the Companies Act, 1956, as amended up to 30 June 2006, limits individual directorships to fifteen 
companies; Section 278 (1) excludes from the computation of fifteen companies, directorships in private companies 
that are neither subsidiaries nor holding companies of public companies, any unlimited company, and any company 
where the individual serves as alternate director to another specified individual on that board. An alternate director is 
qualified to act in place of the substantive director during his or her absence or incapacity. An individual could in 
addition also be occupying a position equivalent to a director in case of a company, in any number of organisations 
and bodies corporate or otherwise such as Trusts etc. which do not fall under the purview of the definition of a 
company under the Act, without being in violation of the fifteen company limit on company directorships!. The 
Companies Bill, 2009 under parliamentary scrutiny does, however, substantially restricts such exemptions  
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2007, found that 58% of the sample companies had restrictions on their CEOs serving on outside 
boards. 7% did not allow any, 13% allowed one outside board, 21%, 14% and 3% respectively 
permitted two, three and four outside boards. Companies seemed to be less severe on other 
senior  full  time  executive  directors,  with  67%  of  the  sample  companies  not  having  any 
restrictions at all. The study did not cover the outside directorships of non-executive directors. In 
the UK, the trend appeared to be towards lower engagement in outside board activity by non-
executive board chairs (89% of whom were non-executive during the period), down to 58% from 
the  73%  in  the  previous  year.  CEOs  of  the  sample  companies  serving  on  outside  quoted 




Internationalization of business also leads to a greater measure of cross-country board interlocks 
both for control purposes (especially in case of transnational subsidiaries and affiliates) and for 
favorably  managing  external  dependencies.  With  growing  globalisation  of  businesses  and 
markets, cross-country interlocks do appear to be on the rise. Kentor and Jang (2004) conclude 
from a study of interlocks of the Fortune Global 500 in 1983 and 1998, that “First, there has 
indeed been a significant increase in the number of global linkages among the boards of directors 
of the world‟s largest corporations over the past two decades. Second, the growth in international 
linkages has outpaced the expansion of domestic ties. Third, the geographical distribution and 
intensification of these ties do not reflect the global distribution of corporate headquarters.” They 
also distinguish their findings from those of Carroll and Fennema (2002) who studied samples of 
176  leading  international  corporations  in  1976  and  in  1996  and  found  that  across  the  two 
decades, “[Ties] among the world‟s largest corporations continued for the most part to respect 15 
 
national  borders;  …there  has  been  no  massive  shift  in  corporate  interlocking,  from  a 
predominantly national to a predominantly transnational pattern. …[T]ransnational network is a 
kind of superstructure that rests upon rather resilient national bases. There has been a loosening 
of the international network, which …reflects the tendency toward exit-based rather than voice-
based corporate governance.” As Kentor and Jang‟s study had a significantly larger sample and 
covered  a  later  time  period  (by  two  years  at  the  end-line)  their  conclusions  may  be  more 
reflective of the actual developments in this field. However, given the furious pace at which 
global corporate relations are taking shape and with several developing countries substantially 
enhancing their footprints in other parts of the world, the jury is probably still out on this critical 
issue. 
 
Why Do Boards Interlock? 
In  the context  of American  corporations,  “The institution of the interlocking directorate  has 
continued to exist since the early days of corporate capitalism. This is of some interest in itself, 
because it is doubtful that it would have survived without serving some material purpose. The 
critical question is what purpose (or purposes) does it serve” (Dooley, 1969). Also, from an 
organizational theory perspective, such interlocks do not appear to be casual coincidences either. 
Neither are they “random or independent factors but … rational organizational responses to the 
conditions of the external environment.” (Pfeffer, 1972).He postulated:  
“Business  organizations  (and  other  organizations,  too)  use  their  boards  of 
directors as vehicles through which they co-opt, or partially absorb, important 
external organizations with which they are interdependent. The strategy of co-
optation involves exchanging some degree of control and privacy of information 
for continued support from the external organization. Co-optation, as a tactic, is 
likely to be utilized when total absorption is (1) legally proscribed, (2) impossible 
due to resource constraints, or (3) when partial inclusion is sufficient to solve the 
organization‟s problems of dealing with the external organization.” 16 
 
 
Mintzberg (1983) has also approvingly referred to this co-optation strategy in his enumeration of 
the service roles of boards, gaining power over external organizations through the vehicle of 
board seats: 
 
“The  organization  may  try  to  diffuse  the  power  of  an  important  external 
influencer by providing that person the status of a seat on the board.  … The 
external influencer can content himself with the status instead of a serious say in 
decision-making. Or else,  the organization may  try to elicit the support of an 
influential individual who might otherwise ignore it, as when a private hospital or 
university offers a board seat to a wealthy potential donor. .. .” 
 
Overall, interlocks appear to be triggered when external interdependencies of an organization are 
large and substantial, and concomitantly, total absorption of such external entities are neither 
feasible nor permitted, or even necessary. Competition and anti-trust legislation in countries may 
militate against such total absorption; resource constraints may rule out complete acquisition of 
such  external  entities.  A  further  factor  that  appears  to  favor  interlocks  is  the  potential 
enhancement in organizational reputation through such celebrity associations.  
In  this  view of the  matter,  justification  of  board interlocks  may  be  seen as  evidence  of the 
Resource  Dependence  approach  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik,  1978)  that  postulates  firms  exerting 
control over their environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive and grow. The most 
direct method for controlling dependence is to control the source of that dependence. One is not 
always in a position to achieve control over dependence through acquisition and ownership, 
however. However, linkages could be forged except where they are proscribed. Four categories 
of benefits that companies look for in such linkages are: 
  First, information exchange about the activities of that organisation, which may impinge on 
or affect the focal organisation. For example, interlocking directors among competitors may 
provide each with information about the other‟s costs and pricing and market strategy plans.. 17 
 
  Second, opening up a communication channel between organisations to convey information. 
For  example,  a  banker  on  a  board,  learning  of  its  requirements,  may  convey  a  funding 
business opportunity to his bank. 
  Third, a support commitment from important elements of the environment. For example, a 
co-opted board member, exposed to the perspectives of the company, tends to align his views 
and communications accordingly. 
  Fourth, association of prestigious co-opted directors legitimises the company and adds to its 
reputational value.   
 
In this approach, company boards would prefer to co-opt individuals who can provide them with 
necessary linkages to the external environment necessary to subserve their objectives. A related 
cooptation initiative would be to induct people whose presence on the board would help to blunt 
to some extent any opposition they may have while being outside the board. Thus, “When an 
organization appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the 
organization, will concern himself with its problems, will favorably present it to others, and will 
try to aid it. … A board member is publicly identified with the organization, and thus may be 
expected to accept some responsibility for its actions. … [T]he feeling of participating in setting 
organizational policy makes the individual both more identified with, and more committed to, 
that policy.” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
 
This category would include persons with name and fame in their chosen field of activity and 
those who have networking connections with external organizations, or authorities who have the 
power and potential to help or hinder the corporation in achieving its goals, and opinion makers 
who adopt apparently adversarial positions.  Interlocking boards in such circumstances aligns 
people with access to resources the company is dependent upon with the interests of the firm. 
Traditional and cultural influences also bear upon director clustering. Nayak and Maclean (2007) 18 
 
point out that the rich history of India‟s business elite and its cultural substrata that underlie 
societies goes very deep; change at this deeper, sedimentary level is slow but, the “strength of 
cultural  reproduction,  inducing  continuity  whilst  not  preventing  change,”  is  indeed  striking. 
Thus,  in  India,  during  the  colonial  phase  there  was  a  corporate  elite  comprising  of  British 
managing  agency  personnel  who  sat  on  the  boards  of  their  managed  companies.  Indian 
businessmen were tied together by bonds of community and religion, creating their own set of 
business  elites  and  helping  each  other.  When  the  British  managing  agencies  needed  local 
knowledge  and  contacts,  resources  that  were  external  to  their  organizations,  they  gradually 
inducted some of the Marwari businessmen following the co-optation route discussed earlier. 
Nationalism and the struggle for political freedom during the nineteenth and twentieth century 
were other binding factors that helped to create Indian business elites who sat on each other‟s 
boards. The process has continued since then and has been further strengthened with the rapid 
industrialization and globalization of the Indian business environment in recent decades.  
 
What Do Board Interlocks Mean to the Companies and the Society? 
Over time, board interlocks have acquired a notorious reputation that they are inherently bad and 
hence undesirable; probably, this is so in a vast majority of such linkages as empirically and 
anecdotally documented. On the flip side, it is also possible that such inter-connections when 
exploited  on  ethical  lines  may  contribute  to  the  wellbeing  of  society  and  the  respective 
corporations  and  their  stakeholders  including  the  stockholders.  While  this  potential  will  be 
further explored in later sections of this paper especially in the context of empirical evidence that 




Berle  and Means  (1932)  expressed the view that  they  such  interlocks  were  generally to the 
advantage of the corporations concerned and were not only acceptable but also desirable, so long 
as the directors made full disclosure of their position in situations of interest conflicts. They 
wrote: 
“Where  a  single  individual  finds  himself  a  director  of  two  companies  whose 
policies conflict, he may have some difficult choices to make. In strict ethics the 
business community regards it his duty to solve the situation according to the best 
business sense he may have. A still nicer feeling on the subject might lead him to 
resign from one of the two directorates. But the latter alternative may not be to the 
best interest of either of his corporations, since the very existence of a conflicting 
interest on the board of a competing or adversary company may supply a channel 
of communication by which the difficulty can ultimately be solved to the best 
advantage of both.” 
 
Berle and Means‟ approach was quite appropriate in the context of corporate imperatives to 
enlist the support of external agencies that were capable of influencing their survival and growth. 
As they pointed out: 
 
“ …[T]he charge that directors are interested on both sides of the transaction is 
entirely loosely made in the financial community. A director, especially if he is an 
important man financially, will have a dozen or more interests all going at once. 
In many cases the action taken by him in one corporation is necessarily more or 
less adverse to the interests of other corporations in which he may be interested.  
[C]orporations expect to transact business with each other or in the same field, to 
their mutual advantage; and the very duality of interest of the director is thus 
turned to the advantage of both.”  
 
 
Leaving  aside  the  practical  benefits  to  corporations  and  especially  to  their  directors  and 
management, such interlocks potentially are injurious to the absentee shareholders and in a wider 
sense  to  all  stakeholders  of  the  corporation.  Besides,  they  lead  to  monopolistic  tendencies 
militating against competition and other public policy interests. This was indeed the position that 
Louis Brandeis advocated; that interlocking directorates were inherently bad for society, since 20 
 
amongst other things, they tended to cartelize and contain competition to the disadvantage of the 
consumers. Among the earliest and most scathing among the critics of such interlocks in the US, 
Brandeis portrayed board interlocks as follows:  
 
“The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends 
laws  human  and  divine.  Applied  to  rival  corporations,  it  tends  to  the 
suppression of competition and to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to 
corporations which deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to violation 
of the fundamental law that no man can serve two masters. In either event it 
leads  to  inefficiency;  for  it  removes  incentive  and  destroys  soundness  of 
judgement. It is undemocratic, for it rejects the platform: „A fair field and no 
favors,‟ substituting the pull of privilege for the push of manhood. It is the 
most potent instrument of the Money Trust. Break the control so exercised by 
the  investment  bankers  over  railroads,  public  service  and  industrial 
corporations, over banks, life insurance and trust companies, and a long step 
will have been taken toward attainment of the New Freedom.”
8 
 
It is indeed interesting to note that the wisdom of such an approach has never been in much 
doubt. Even those who were actually in positions of such interlocks, multiple directorships and 
potential interest conflict, always found some ways of reluctantly rationalising the practice. 
9 
 
Nearly a century later, expressions of similar concurrence in principle but concerns in practice, 
can still be heard in corporate corridors, among directors who are hard pressed for time. As we 
have noted earlier, there are good theoretical and practical grounds on which corporations tend to 
engage  in  such  interlocks  and  multiple  directorships,  but  there  are  equally  weighty 
considerations of public policy and private fiduciary responsibilities that need to be addressed. 
 
                                                            
8Chapter III: Interlocking Directorates, in Other People’s Money, Brandeis, Louis D (1913), Harpers‟ Weekly, 13 
December2004, Law Library, Brandeis School of Law, Louisville 
 
9  For an illuminating exchange of views between Louis Brandeis and Thomas Lamont, then a partner of J P Morgan 
and a key target of attack, see  Brandeis and Lamont on Finance Capitalism, Abrahams, Paul P (1973), Business 
History Review, Spring, pp. 72–94 
 21 
 
The  Clayton  Act  of  1914  in  the  US  prohibited  interlocking  directorates  among  competing 
corporations,  but  not  otherwise.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  comprehensive  legislation  on 
Competition Law in India has not yet addressed the issue of board interlocks as a potential threat 
to fair competition. 
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3 
Methodology of Network Analysis 
 
Humans intuitively understand that certain actors are more powerful and influential than others 
because of the networks they are embedded in. However the first sociogram or a picture that 
depicted  networks  was  drawn  by  Moreno.  In  early,  1930s,  he  depicted  relationships  of 
individuals by drawing nodes to represent individuals and lines to represent relationships. He 
used these diagrams to study structural properties of groups.  Over years, network analysis has 
become to be known as a disciplined enquiry into patterns of social relationships between and 
among actors. Freeman (2004, pg 10) defines social network analysis as a method of social 
research that displays four features:  
  a structural intuition, which recognizes the importance of ties that link social actors;  
  systematic relational data, which can help generate reports of patterned social interactions 
(ibid. pg 16);  
  graphic images that depict the patterned social interactions  
  mathematical  or  computational  models  to  clarity  the  concepts  and  spell  out  the 
consequences (pg. 25) 
Accordingly, this study uses network analysis to analyze board interlocks in the chosen sample 
companies and directors. Following is a brief introduction to the network methodologies used 
here. 
 
Relational data between various actors is usually one mode in nature, which are straightforward 
actor  to  actor  networks.  However,  sometimes  actors  are  affiliated  to  one  another  through 23 
 
common  events  they  participate  in  or  attend.  Networks  arising  from  individuals  or  entities 
interacting with each other while being engaged in a single forum (such as a board of directors or 
even  assembly  of  companies  such  as  an  industry  association)  are  referred  to  as  „category 
membership networks‟ or „two mode networks‟. Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 291) describe 
“affiliation  networks  are  two  mode  networks  consisting  of  set  of  actors  and  set  of  events…and  the 
connections among members of one of the modes are based on the linkages established through the 
second  mode”.  In  line  with the  most  popular  method  of  analysis  of  two  mode  networks,  we 
separated  them  into  single  mode  networks  before  they  can  be  analyzed.  This  method  was 
introduced by Brieger in his paper The Duality of Person and Group (1974). Most two mode 
networks are collected from archival data (Valente, 2010). The original data is in a tabular form 
in which rows are individuals and columns are organizations they are part of. As Valente (pg 48) 
explains that the “table is a matrix, which can then be transposed and post-multiplied to yield an 
individuals-by-individuals matrix representing the number of joint memberships. The transposed 
matrix can be pre-multiplied (placed first) to yield an organization-by-organization matrix.”  
 
Figure 1 depicts a classic affiliation network where Directors are occupying board position in 
companies. For instance, directors A and B are on the board of companies 1 and 3 but B is also 
on the board of 2, which he shares with C. Hence, B is connected to A and C. D on the other 
hand is on the boards of 1 and 4. D is connected to A and B through the company 1 and to C and 
E through the company 4. This figure can be separated into a two one mode networks - one 




The  two  mode  network  data  of  directors  and  companies  was  separated  was  done  using  Ucinet  6.0 
software (Borgatti, et al. 1999).  
 
In our study, data on directors from 2001 to 2010 has been analysed using the above mentioned 
process.  Since,  graphical  representation  of  the  entire  network  requires  larger  paper  sizes, 
networks of „highly boarded director‟  (individual on more than 5 boards) are shown in  this 
manuscript. Additionally, instead of showing data from all the years, networks of four years 
which  sufficiently  captures  the  evolution  of  the  networks  are  given  in  Exhibits  5  to  12. 
Specifically, networks for the years 2001, 2005, 2008 and 2009 are shown. The size of the node 
indicates the basic network measure of degree centrality. This is a simple measure that indicates 
the  number  of  connections  to  and  from  each  node.  The  networks  are  dense  and  are  well 
connected to one another. Complete details of the network charts for all years from 2001 to 2010 
are included separately in the appendix to this report.    
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4 
Description of the Study Sample 
The  sample  consists  of  the  NSE100  companies  from  2000  to  2010.  In  certain  cases  a  few 
observations  were  missing  and  as  a  result  the  final  sample  came  down  to  967  firm-year 
observations for the 10 year period. The process of sample construction is discussed below. 
 
Sample construction:   
The data for the study was collated from multiple sources. These include  
  National Stock Exchange (http://www.nseindia.com)   
  CMIE, Prowess  
  Annual Reports from Insight (http://insight.religaretechnova.com/Insight/index.asp ) 
  Director‟s  database, Prime and BSE (http://www.directorsdatabase.com) and  
  Individual company reports  
 
CMIE‟s Prowess was the primary data source. We extracted firm level information from 2001 to 
2010on various characteristics such as financial and performance variables, information relating 
to ownership groups, composition of boards of directors, industry classification, etc.  
 
The following were the steps in arriving at the final sample.   
1.  The current list of NSE 100 companies was obtained by combining CNX Nifty Junior 
and  S&P  CNX  Nifty  companies.  The  data  was  obtained  from  two  NSE 
websites(http://www.nseindia.com/content/indices/ind_nifty.htmand  ; 
http://www.nseindia.com/content/indices/ind_jrnifty.htm), 26 
 
2.  To trace back the list of companies in earlier years of the NSE 100, we looked at the 
information pertaining to the details of the past changes to S&P CNX Nifty and the 
junior nifty constituents. This provided information regarding the date of inclusion
10. In 
respect of this derived NSE 100 list of companies, the CMIE – Prowess database was 
queried to get the Directors list. Missing data was obtained manually by sifting through 
copies  of  company‟s  annual  reports.  A  great  deal  of  cleaning  up  was  necessary  to 
overcome problems associated with First Names, Last Names, Middle Names, and so 
on. In many cases, initials of the directors were given in Prowess instead of their full 
names which involved telephone calls to company head offices or cross-checking with 
relevant web sites Prime Database.  
 
3.  After  this  cleaning  CMIE-Prowess  database  was  queried  to  get    data  on  multiple 
directorships if any in other companies  outside of NSE 100..This provided multiple 
directorships held by NSE 100 directors in all other listed NSE companies. 
 
4.  Finally, after the relevant data regarding the companies listed in NSE and the multiple 
directors were obtained, we constructed the four key explanatory variables used in the 
regression  analysis  (i.e.  Boardedness,  Degree,  Betweeness  and  Eigen  vector)
11.  In  
addition, we collected the corresponding data relating to  performance variables (ROA 
                                                            
10 To get the names of the companies and number that were listed on NSE as per the referenced dates ,we accessed 
the NSE website to get the trading information of securities such as  Equity shares, Indian Depository Receipts 
(IDRs), Preference Shares, Debt Instruments, Warrants, Close Ended MF Schemes (Listed), Securities available for 
trading in IL series, Securities available for trading in ETF, Changes in Company Names, Changes in Symbols, 
Listed companies suspended from trading for non-compliance, List of companies delisted, Companies not submitted 
Corporate Governance Report, List of Companies - Clause 40A, List of top 100 common companies for Common 
Filing, Data on Shareholding Pattern, Legend for series of different securities etc. Based on the securities 
information collected we checked the details of companies collected. By doing this, we segregated the companies 
that were listed on NSE and delisted as per the referenced date. 
 
11 Detailed of thee are provided in Appendix 1 27 
 
and Q-Ratio), and other variables such as ownership structure, size, age, leverage and 
indicator variables for industry and year. The details of these variables are provided in  
the appendix 1 
Data descriptives: 
Panel A provides the characteristics of NSE 100 companies in the sample over the study time 
frame of 2001 to 2010: 
  Total number of directors increased from 888 to 1104. 
  Total number of director positions (seats) increased from 1415 to 2037. 
  The total number of multiple directors increased from 242 to 414 and the proportion of 
multiple directorships has increased from 27% to 38%.  
  The cumulation ratio (no of director seats by number of directors) increased from 1.59 to 
1.85. 
 
We termed directors who are in the board of 5 and more companies as „highly boarded directors‟ 
(HBD).  As is evident from Table 1 have increased from 40 in 2001 to 71 in 2010.  
 
The table also gives information on multiplicity and distance. Multiplicity indicates the number 
of common directors any two companies share. While the most of the companies only share one 
director,  those  companies  that  share  2  directors  have  increased.  The  Distance  dimension 
indicates the number of directors who can be reached within, 1, 2 or more than 2 degrees of 
separation. The overall numbers indicate that most NSE directors are on the periphery without 
connections to others directors and require more than two degree to reach them.  
 28 
 
Panel B provides the industry categorization of the highly boarded directors (HBD). 
 
We also collected the details pertaining to the link between the highly boarded directors and 
market cap. This data is given in Panel C. The most striking aspect of Panel C is the increase in 
the number of highly boarded directors from just 40 in 2001 to 71 in 2010. These highly boarded 
directors form just a tiny fraction of the total number of directors. The average over the study 
timeframe of ten years is around 6 percent. However, they exercise enormous influence on the 
Indian corporate economy. This can be gauged from both the number and growth of highly 
boarded companies which these associated directors are involved in, from just 167 in 2001 to 
486 in 2010. The growth of market capitalization of these highly boarded companies has also 
been significant as a percentage of the total market capitalization of the NSE. It has risen from 43 
percent in 2001 to 66 percent in 2010. The fact that 6% of the directors control 66% of the total 
market cap of all NSE listed companies is truly remarkable. This trend can be noticed pictorially 










Panel D and E depict the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. In certain instances as 
can be seen from Panel D, the sample size dropped down from 967 for the ownership variables, 
performance measures and other controls owing to missing data. The ownership variables reflect 
shareholding percentages. In panel E, the significant correlations are indicated by asterisks. It is 
particularly striking to see the high degree of positive correlation between the key explanatory 
variables  
Our primary theoretical lenses for examining director interlocks are Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and Resource dependence hypothesis (Peffer and Salanzick, 1978). The specific 
predictions of the interlock variables from the perspective of agency and resource-based theory 
are indicated below after the basic regression specification utilized for the analysis is introduced. 
The basic regression specification, which is employed for the analysis, is as follows: 
Performance i, t   =       +     Boardednessi, t   +  kξ Connectedness+   l  Controls i, t  +   i, t.   
Boardedness proxies for Agency implications associated firm performance while Connectedness (as 
defined through its three dimensions: Degree, Betweeness and Eigen vector) proxies for the Resource 
dependence hypothesis  
Our predictions associated with both agency and the resource dependence hypotheses are the following:      
Agency hypothesis:  < 0 
Resource Dependence hypothesis ξ > 0 
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As the data is in the form of panel data, the regression models are estimated using Random Effects GLS 
Estimation and Fixed Effects Estimation methods.  
 
Tables (1) to (4) represent the full sample analysis. Tables (1) and (2) represent the fixed effects 
and random effects models for ROA. Model (2) indicates that boardedness is positive and 
significant. Model (5) indicates that Eigen vector is positive and significant. Model (6) has all the 
connectedness variables introduced together. Once again, Eigen vector remains positive and 
significant. Model (7) represents the global model with all connectedness and bordededness 
variables introduced simultaneously. Eigen vector continues to be positive and significant 
indicating that Eigen vector represents our strongest result. This result remains consistent across 
Tables (1) and (2) (i.e. both fixed and random effects estimations).  
 
These results indicate that boardedness which proxies for the agency hypothesis on the 
monitoring implications associated with being on the board of several boards is not supported 
(i.e. the boardedness coefficient is positive and significant instead of a negative and significant 
coefficient as hypothesized).However, while Degree and Betweeness are not significant, Eigen 
vector is consistently positive and significant indicating that the resource dependence hypothesis 
is supported. 
 
Interestingly, all regression models in Tables (3) and (4) wherein Tobin‟s-Q ratio is the 
performance measure is insignificant. Apparently (and counter-intuitively), market based 




Tables (5) to (20) depict the variables sub-sample analysis. These include sub-sample analysis 
for Indian Promoters, Foreign Promoters, and Government Promoters. The purpose of this 
analysis to discern the impact of various connectedness variables and boardedness variables 
among the main ownership categories. The sub-sample analysis broadly depicts the following 
results. 
  Among Indian Promoters, boardedness represents the most consistent set of results 
across Tables (5) to (8). The strong positive and significant effects of the boardedness 
variables among the Indian promoters sub-sample once again is a negation of the  agency 
hypothesis on the increasing costs associated with monitoring as the number of multiple 
directorships increases.  
 
  Tables (9) to (12) represent the sub-sample analysis for foreign promoters. The most 
consistent result for this sample is the negative effect of betweeness in Tables (8) and (9) 
(wherein the performance measure is ROA).However, the magnitudes associated with 
these coefficients are very negligible and consequently the effect sizes are miniscule. 
 
  Tables (13) to (16) depicts the results of the government promoters. However, since the 
sub-sample sizes are small (98 firm year observations), we hesitate to make any 
inferences from this sub-sample.  
 
  The final set of tables from (17) to (20) depict the results of the manufacturing only sub-
sample. Given the concerns associated with using performance measures such as ROA in 
services and non-financial services, we wanted to confirm the robustness of the results 32 
 
with a sample of manufacturing only firms. The results remain broadly consistent with 
the full sample results depicted in tables (1) to (4). 
 
The regression base models were tested for multi-collinearity effects with Variance Inflection 
Factor (VIF) tests.  The VIF levels were found to be within tolerance limits. In addition, 
alternative model specifications for the sub-sample results also yielded a consistent set of results.  
 
Finally, we conducted the regression analysis using Return on Equity (RoE) as the performance 
measure
12. The full sample results are depicted in Appendix 3. As with the earlier results we 
depict both fixed and random effects regression results. Panel A depicts the fixed effects models. 
Once again, consistent with the ROA results, Boardedness and Eigen vector are positive and 
significant. The ROE regressions also pick up a significant positive effect for Betweeness but the 
magnitude of the coefficient is very small. Model (6) which introduces all the connectedness 
variables together remains consistent (i.e. Eigen vector continues to remain positive and 
significant in line with the ROA regressions). However, Model (7) does not pick the significance 
of the Eigen vector. This could potentially be on account of the high correlation levels between 
the  different key measures. Panel B, repeats the exercise with Random effects models, once 
again, Boardedness and Eigen vector continue to be positive and significant. However, the 
random effects models pick up significance for Betweeness and Degree as well but the 
magnitudes are small. Models (6) and (7) display similar characteristics as in Panel A. Overall, 
the ROE results display a degree of conformity with the ROA results, with Boardedness and 
Eigen vector being the most consistent set of results.   
                                                            
12 We thank the workshop participants at IIM Bangalore, wherein the initial findings of this study were presented for 






This  exploratory  research  attempts  to  identify  patterns  among  interlocks  of  directors  and  to 
examine  their  linkage  with  market  capitalization  and  performance.  A  key  finding,  which 
emerges, is that a small proportion of „highly boarded‟ directors control a significant portion of 
the market capitalization of the NSE. While this raises concerns on the efficacy of the recently 
introduced  corporate  governance  norms,  which  are  aimed  at  increasing  the  diversity  in  the 
director pool, the regression analysis depicts that there is a positive impact of  boardedness and 
connectedness  (as  proxied  by  Eigen  vector)  on  ROA.  In  a  nutshell,  from  public  policy 
perspective,  the  analysis  potentially  reflects  the  „bad  cholesterol‟  elements  of  multiple 
directorships in terms of a tiny segment of „highly boarded‟ directors controlling a significant 
portion  of  the  country‟s  economic  prowess,  whereas  the  positive  influences  on  company 
performance provide some evidence of the „good cholesterol‟. 
The key findings of this study can now be summarized: 
1.  Interlocking boards of directors is a predominant feature of the Indian corporate sector. A 
small group of highly boarded directors (defined as those sitting on 5 or more boards) 
constituting about 6% of the overall director population relatable to the NSE 100 
companies during 2001 – 2010, control some 66% of the total market capitalization of all 
NSE listed companies as of  2010.  34 
 
2.  Contrary to the generally held view that multiple directorships tend to militate against 
quality time and attention being provided to the companies, this factor turned out to be 
positive in relation to the performance of the companies. In other words, the agency 
hypothesis on the monitoring implications associated with being on the board of several 
boards is not supported. It appears that the benefits of multiple directorships reflected in 
transferring best practices and processes among companies, a postulate of the resource 
dependence theory, takes precedence over any countervailing disadvantages of such 
multiple directorships.  
3.  Market based measures do not seem to be influenced by the effects associated with high 
Boardedness and Connectedness of directors.  
The implications for public policy are indeed quite significant (Mizruchi 2004, Adams and 
Brock, 1986). Concentration of economic power in the hands of a limited few (as represented 
by 66% of market capitalization being controlled by 6% of the director population) would 
indeed  be  a  source  of  concern.  Adam  Smith  (1980,  p.  359)  admonished  the  state  to  be 
cautious while considering legislative proposals emanating from the business sector with 
great circumspection and even suspicion since they came from “an  order of men, whose 
interest is never exactly the same with that of the public..” Reviewing the situation in the US, 
Bassiry  and  Jones  (2004)  demonstrated  how  the  “incredible  concentration  of  economic 
resources  translates,  however  imperfectly,  into  political  power  and  undermines  the 
democratic process.” It is also worthwhile recalling the concerns expressed by Berle and 
Means (1932) who noted:  
“The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic 
power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state . . . Where its 
own interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The future 35 
 
may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an 
equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form 
of social organization.” 
 
While on this, it may be noted that an even a minor change in the qualifying directorships (5 in 
this study) would significantly and disproportionately alter the concentration of economic power.  
The second important public policy implication will be on the nature of regulatory regimes. For 
example, when listed companies were mandated to have a higher percentage of non-aligned or 
independent directors on their boards (Clause 49), the assumption was that there would be a 
widening of such independent directors pool. This study shows on the other hand, such a 
mandate has tended to increase multiple directorships and concentration of economic power 
since in a number of cases, such additional independent director vacancies have been filled by 
incumbent independent directors, as revealed by the increase in the highly boarded directors 
population (for example, 40 (2001) to 71 (2010) directors with 5 or more directorships). 
Of course, one could always ask “so what?” – what if high beardedness increased so long as it 
produced more effective contribution to furthering economic growth, what if an increasingly 
smaller number of individuals were to control a progressively larger proportion of economic 
wealth so long as such additional wealth was indeed being created within mandated legitimate 
means, and so on. Unfortunately, the lessons from history do not support a theory of beneficial 
dictatorships: irrespective of how attractive they may have been to begin with, absolute power 
does indeed corrupt absolutely. Such powerful groups tend to first influence and then to dictate 
public policy measures to further their own interests which may not coincide with the interests of 
large segments of the country‟s citizenry. Experience and wisdom therefore suggest that such 36 
 













The Research Road Ahead 
 
Board interlock studies have traditionally been limited to corporate entities; even then research 
has been hindered by lack of credible data availability. But with the growing size and power of 
corporations and their elite directors, the interface between and among corporations, government 
and the society is increasingly strident. The free movement from business to government and 
government  to  business  (Hank  Paulson,  to  cite  just  one  recent  example,  who  moved  from 
Goldman  Sachs  to  Treasury  Secretary  in  US),  and  the  equally  free  communion  among 
businessmen,  politicians  and  other  socialites  in  general,  offer  enormous  opportunities  for 
building personal relationships that can turn out to be useful resources. To be holistic, then, such 
interlock studies should go beyond corporations alone and encompass connections between and 
among individuals, entities (including cooperatives, partnerships, trusts, not for profits, sports 
bodies, and so on), political parties and the bureaucracy, not to omit instruments and institutions 
of government such as parliament and state assemblies. A person‟s resourcefulness (what he or 
she brought to the table) would thus be determined by his or her networks not only among other 
corporates but also the in the wider canvas of the polity. Undoubtedly, obtaining credible data 
that would stand rigorous academic scrutiny would pose a major problem but given its overriding 
importance and value, researchers may have to find appropriate solutions to get such data. 
On a more limited if less ambitious plane, further research could be directed in the following 
directions: 38 
 
  Institutionalizing credible data collection and dissemination on a dynamic and continuing 
basis on board and director related statistics to facilitate ongoing study, which would 
assist both corporations and policymakers. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs which is 
the nodal agency for corporate statistics may be best suited to make this possible 
  A weighted boarding index could be developed to reflect the weightage of companies 
based not only on the simple number of directors with multiple directorships but also the 
value of such directorships based on the size, importance, distance, company centrality 
and so on. Research could then focus on corporate performance in relation to its weighted 
boarding index, which might provide useful insights and guidance in board constitution 
  The  analysis  of  the  current  data  could  be  refined  further  by  exploring  lagged 
specifications  and  by  using  spline  regressions  to  assess  the  implications  of  the 
Boardedness and Connectedness variables at different levels. The present study confined 
the analysis to NSE100 companies and directors of these companies occupying board 
positions  on  other  NSE  companies.  Future  work  should  extend  this  analysis  to  all 
NSE/BSE listed companies and explore if the findings attributable to the NSE100 set is 
applicable to other listed companies beyond the NSE100 as well. 
  Finally, an interesting line of enquiry, which could be potentially probed, is the impact of 
the  phased  adoption  of  Clause  49  (see  Appendix  2)  and  its  implications  on  director 





Panel A: Descriptive statistics of overall network of NSE100 for all directors 
 
A. Total number of directors: Count of number 
of all directors in the NSE 100 
B. Total number of director seats: Count of all 
directors including the number of multiple 
directorships each director holds in NSE 100 
 
C. Total number of multiple directorships: 
Count of total number of directors with 
multiple directorships in NSE 100 
 
D. Proportion of multiple directorships: Total 
number of multiple directorships (C)/Total 
number of directors (A) 
E.  Cumulation ratio: Total number of director 






2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Total Number of Directors (A)   888   909   986   1129   1080   1056   1081   1071   1109   1104  
Total Number of Director 
Seats (B)   1415   1451   1611   1819   1798   1781   1960   1947   1914   2037  
Total Number of Multiple 
Directors (C )   242   253   294   326   337   329   378   382   369   414  
Proportion of Multiple 
Directors(D)   0.27   0.28   0.30   0.29   0.31   0.31   0.35   0.36   0.33   0.38  
Cumulation Ratio (E)   1.59   1.60   1.63   1.61   1.66   1.69   1.81   1.82   1.73   1.85  
Number of Director Seats held 
by a multiple director                                      
 
2   121   153   148   164   180   160   168   189   201   204  
3   55   43   64   73   59   74   88   79   69   87  
4   26   33   31   39   38   33   50   45   37   52  
5   17   12   27   22   30   26   31   25   23   29  
>5   23   24   24   28   30   36   41   44   39   42  40 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of overall network of NSE100 for all directors (Contd.) 
 




                               
 
1   91.70%   92.23%   91.76%   92.34%   91.28%   91.24%   88.22%   88.20%   89.22%   86.53%  
2   6.36%   6.55%   7.12%   6.25%   7.06%   7.35%   9.77%   10.29%   9.57%   11.28%  
3   1.70%   0.89%   0.81%   0.97%   1.28%   1.15%   1.84%   1.26%   1.03%   1.54%  
4   0.23%   0.33%   0.31%   0.44%   0.37%   0.27%   0.17%   0.17%   0.09%   0.65%  
5   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.08%   0.09%   0.00%  
Distance (G)  
                 
 
1   1.8%   1.7%   1.8%   1.7%   1.7%   1.7%   1.6%   1.5%   1.5%   1.8%  
2   8.7%   8.3%   7.6%   7.9%   7.5%   8.0%   8.5%   8.0%   8.1%   7.6%  





data)   91   93   96   99   98   95   96   98   97   99  
No. of NSE 




F. Multiplicity: The number of separate contacts, which make up the relationship and are a measure of 
the intensity of the relationship. Operationally, it is the number of interlocking directors that any two 
firms have. 
 
G. The Distance: It is a measure of the closeness between any two members of the network. 









Panel B: Industry categorization of highly boarded directors 




2001  129  18  20 
2002  131  11  17 
2003  152  13  28 
2004  158  18  27 
2005  178  19  37 
2006  171  28  33 
2007  199  24  46 
2008  205  30  53 
2009  176  30  45 
















Panel C: Highly boarded directors and the market capitalization of highly boarded 




















































2001  40  888  167  315  53%  5%  264546.61  611640.49  43% 
2002  36  909  159  324  49%  4%  237011.31  708688.35  33% 
2003  51  986  192  371  52%  5%  247938.29  706727.46  35% 
2004  50  1129  203  380  53%  4%  613208.97  1301937.53  47% 
2005  60  1080  234  398  59%  6%  1009224.31  1752545.01  58% 
2006  62  1056  234  398  59%  6%  1959535.29  2983980.12  66% 
2007  72  1081  269  465  58%  7%  2466025.27  3504254.08  70% 
2008  69  1071  288  489  59%  6%  3432160.38  5021182.63  68% 
2009  62  1109  251  433  58%  6%  1634687.29  2907299.80  56% 

















43% of NSE Market Cap44 
 
 















58% of NSE Market Cap45 
 





   
6% of Directors
23% of Companies
68% of NSE Market Cap46 
 





   
6% of Directors
20% of Companies






















































































Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Boardedness  967  2.2113  0.9409  1  6.75 
Degree  966  18.8248  7.2208  0  43.25 
Betweeness  967  2876.938  2415.954  0  13268.04 
Eigenvector  967  0.0215  0.0312  0  0.203 
Government promoters  951  6.0563  19.3138  0  89.78 
Indian promoters  951  29.5586  27.4154  0  88.58 
Foreign promoters  951  10.9927  21.1822  0  91.47 
Foreign Financial Institutions  951  13.486  11.2513  0  68.85 
Indian Financial Institutions  951  14.4818  10.7133  0.07  72.61 
Financial Leverage  963  0.8059  0.4423  0.2353  3.3413 
Age of Enterprise  967  42.9742  26.9495  2  123 
Size  956  22719.38  42279.33  250.24  265051.7 
ROA  956  0.0843  0.0694  -0.0397  0.2521 
Tobins-Q Ratio  959  2.4502  1.4274  0.7627  7.5502  
 
 
Panel E: Correlation Matrix 
Significant correlations are depicted by * for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, *** for p<0.01  










Year  Leverage  Size  ROA 
                             
Degree  1    
                     
  
Betweeness  0.6829***  1 
                     
  
Eigenvector  0.7263***  0.6059***  1 
                   
  
Boardedness  0.7293***  0.7967***  0.7799***  1 
                 
  
Tobins_Q  -0.0478  0.0091  -0.0232  0.0313  1 
               
  




0.1088***  1 
             
  
Indian Promoters  -0.1088***  -0.1349***  -0.0375  -0.0313  -0.0031  -0.3275***  1 
           
  
Foreign Promoters  -0.0894***  0.0005  -0.0385  -0.0067  0.2399***  -0.1615***  -0.4529***  1 
         
  
FII  0.1544***  0.1207***  0.0379  0.1022***  0.2025***  -0.0887***  -0.1483*** 
-
0.2082***  1 
       
  
Indian Institutions  0.227***  0.2357***  0.1982***  0.1827*** 
-
0.2062***  -0.0765**  -0.4064*** 
-
0.0601***  -0.0089  1 
     
  
Incorporation Year  -0.1508***  -0.0898***  -0.1769***  -0.0633**  0.147***  -0.1271***  0.2164***  -0.0573*  0.1777***  -0.321***  1 
   
  
Leverage  0.0291  -0.0739**  -0.0814**  -0.132***  -0.0558*  0.2454***  0.0317 
-
0.2216***  0.1333***  -0.0537*  -0.0832***  1 
 
  
Size  0.0969***  -0.0204  -0.1016*** 
-
0.1025***  -0.146***  0.5067***  -0.1364*** 
-
0.2208***  0.1608***  -0.0455  -0.1846***  0.4949***  1    




0.3294***  1 Table 1: Director Interlocks and ROA (Fixed Effects Models) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix1. The standard errors are 





Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0756*** 
(0.0034) 
        0.0066 
(0.0046) 
Degree      0.0003 
(0.0004) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.1101  0.1158  0.1108  0.1101  0.1202  0.1207  0.1232 
 
F-statistic  5.52***  5.51***  5.24***  5.21***  5.75***  5.18***  5.04*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
947  947  946  946  946  946  946 58 
 
Table 2: Director Interlocks and ROA (Random Effects Models) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 





Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0047* 
(0.0028) 
        0.0019 
(0.0042) 
Degree      0.0003 
(0.0004) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 














183.07***  185.60***  183.84***  183.53***  191.24***  190.79***  192.65*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
947  947  946  947  947  946  946 59 
 
Table 3: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q Ratio (Fixed Effects Models) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q Ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 





Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0432 
(0.0689) 
        -0.0011 
(0.0921) 
Degree      0.0021 
(0.0072) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.3836  0.3839  0.3835  0.3841  0.3840  0.3843  0.3843 
 
F-statistic  27.78***  26.24***  26.16***  26.26***  26.26***  23.57***  22.42*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
947  947  946  947  947  946  946 60 
 
Table 4: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q ratio (Random Effects Models) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 





Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0351 
(0.0572) 
        -0.0084 
(0.0857) 
Degree      -0.0032 
(0.0064) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 














472.97***  473.30***  472.44***  474.26***  473.14***  475.89***  474.63*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
947  947  946  947  947  946  946 61 
 
Table 5: Director Interlocks and ROA (Fixed Effects Models: Indian Promoters sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0156*** 
(0.0045) 
         0.0186*** 
(0.0060) 
Degree       0.0005 
(0.0005) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.1116  0.1316  0.1316  0.1121  0.1202  0.1203  0.1366 
F-statistic  5.89***  6.47***  5.46***  5.39***  5.83***  4.97***  5.36*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
666  666  665  666  666  665  665 62 
 
Table 6: Director Interlocks and ROA (Random Effects Models: Indian Promoters sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0104*** 
(0.0035) 
        0.0110** 
(0.0053) 
Degree      0.0006* 
(0.0004) 




Betweenness         0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.2885  0.2687  0.2957  0.2908  0.2858  0.2861  0.2644 
Chi-Square 
statistic 
117.76***  127.56***  121.39***  118.82***  125.57***  124.84***  129.25*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
666  666  665  666  666  665  665 63 
 
Table 7: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q Ratio (Fixed Effects Models-Indian Promoters sub-
sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q Ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.1700** 
(0.0857) 
         0.2829** 
(0.1137) 
Degree      -0.0063 
(0.0087) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.4041  0.4087  0.4045  0.4043  0.4041  0.4058  0.4130 
F-statistic  31.44***  29.31***  28.76***  28.79***  28.76***  24.68***  23.68*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
662  662  661  662  662  661  661 64 
 
Table 8: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q ratio (Random Effects Models- Indian Promoters sub-
sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 








Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.1180* 
(0.0680) 
        0.2005** 
(0.1023) 
Degree      -0.0079 
(0.0075) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.1989  0.1891  0.2035  0.1987  0.1985  0.2122  0.1998 
Chi-Square 
statistic 
349.65***  354.45***  349.86***  350.04***  350.34***  355.32***  360.53*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
662  662  661  662  662  661  661 65 
 
Table 9: Director Interlocks and ROA (Fixed Effects Models-Foreign Promoters Sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    -0.0172*** 
(0.0064) 
         -0.0076 
(0.0092) 
Degree      -0.0009 
(0.0008) 




Betweenness        -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.0817  0.1144  0.0875  0.1348  0.0835  0.1371  0.1402 
 
F-statistic  1.59  2.11**  1.56  2.55***  1.49  2.19***  2.09** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
275  275  274  275  275  274  274 66 
 
Table 10: Director Interlocks and ROA (Random Effects Models-Foreign Promoters Subsample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     -0.0080 
(0.0055) 
        -0.0021 
(0.0088) 
Degree      -0.0002 
(0.0007) 




Betweenness        -0.0000** 
(0.0000) 














28.94***  30.99***  29.23***  35.22***  29.25***  39.03***  38.89*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
275  275  274  275  275  274  274 67 
 
Table 11: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q Ratio (Fixed Effects Models-Foreign Promoters Sub-
sampe) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q Ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 








Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    -0.2399* 
(0.1432) 
        -0.2907 
(0.2098) 
Degree      0.0065 
(0.0168) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.5100  0.5170  0.5110  0.5115  0.5108  0.5145  0.5193 
 
F-statistic  18.35***  17.22***  16.72***  16.84***  16.79***  14.38***  13.61*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
271  271  270  271  271  270  270 68 
 
Table 12: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q ratio (Random Effects Models-Foreign Promoters 
sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    -0.1557 
(0.1138) 
        -0.2563 
(0.1916) 
Degree      0.0024 
(0.0144) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 














202.36***  206.12***  202.11***  203.11***  202.12***  203.04***  206.60*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
271  271  270  271  271  270  270 69 
 
Table 13: Director Interlocks and ROA (Fixed Effects Models- Government Promoters Sub-
sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0021 
(0.0117) 
        -0.0181 
(0.0137) 
Degree       0.0003 
(0.0007) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.3460  0.3463  0.3773  0.3684  0.3663  0.4071  0.4260 
F-statistic  3.84***  3.36***  3.77***  3.69***  3.66***  3.37***  3.28*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
99  99  98  99  99  98  98 70 
 
Table 14: Director Interlocks and ROA (Random Effects Models-Government Promoters Sub-
sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0000 
(0.0111) 
        -0.0145 
(0.0141) 
Degree       0.0002 
(0.0007) 




Betweenness         0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.2647  0.2642  0.2491  0.2470  0.2447  0.2234  0.2212 
Chi-Square 
statistic 
37.63***  37.23***  38.96***  38.18***  37.97***  38.92***  40.43*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
99  99  98  99  99  98  98 71 
 
Table 15: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q Ratio (Fixed Effects Models-Government Promoters 
Sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q Ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 









Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.2726 
(0.2294) 
        0.0252 
(0.2853) 
Degree       0.0149 
(0.0134) 




Betweenness         0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.3376  0.3539  0.3473  0.3550  0.3766  0.3829  0.3830 
F-statistic  4.84***  4.38***  4.18***  4.40***  4.83***  3.65***  3.23*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
95  95  94  95  95  94  94 72 
 
Table 16: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q ratio (Random Effects Models-Government 
Promoters Sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 








Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 










































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.1998 
(0.1835) 
         0.0208 
(0.2528) 
Degree       0.0134 
(0.0123) 




Betweenness         0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.5046  0.4875  0.5047  0.4884  0.4765  0.4777  0.4772 
Chi-Square 
statistic 
64.19***  64.84***  64.37***  64.06***  67.41***  65.82***  65.00*** 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
95  95  94  95  95  94  94 73 
 
Table 17: Director Interlocks and ROA (Fixed Effects Models-Manufacturing sub-sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix. The standard errors are 






Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0095* 
(0.0044) 
         0.0149** 
(0.0061) 
Degree       0.0001 
(0.0005) 




Betweenness        -0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.1461  0.1546  0.1458  0.1483  0.1643  0.1737  0.1843 
 
F-statistic  4.90***  4.92***  4.58***  4.68***  5.28***  5.02***  5.12*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
585  585  584  585  585  584  584 74 
 
Table 18: Director Interlocks and ROA (Random Effects Models-Manufacturing subsample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROA). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix. The standard errors are 






Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0059 
(0.0036) 
         0.0076 
(0.0058) 
Degree       0.0002 
(0.0004) 




Betweenness        -0.0000 
(0.0000) 














98.69***  101.51***  98.52***  98.88***  107.36***  111.46***  113.35*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
585  585  584  585  585  584  584 75 
 
Table 19: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q Ratio (Fixed Effects Models-Manufacturing Sub-
sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q Ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 





Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness     0.0741 
(0.0799) 
         0.0134 
(0.1133) 
Degree       0.0084 
(0.0096) 




Betweenness         0.0000 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.4054  0.4065  0.4064  0.4060  0.4076  0.4079  0.4079 
 
F-statistic  19.52***  18.41***  18.36***  18.38***  18.50***  16.46***  15.60*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
585  585  584  585  585  584  584 76 
 
 
Table 20: Director Interlocks and Tobin’s-Q ratio (Random Effects Models-Manufacturing sub-
sample) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Tobin‟s-Q ratio. The Models 
(1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent director 
Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global models 
with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while Model (7) 
estimates all connectedness and Boardedness variables simultaneously. All models include an intercept, industry dummies and year 
dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix. The standard errors are represented in parenthesis 




Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0339 
(0.0679) 
         0.0357 
(0.1074) 
Degree      -0.0031 
(0.0083) 




Betweenness        0.0000 
(0.0000) 














315.19***  314.97***  314.93***  316.14***  315.74***  317.88***  316.65*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
585  585  584  585  585  584  584 77 
 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables: 
Return on Assets (ROA): Profit after tax/Total assets 
Tobin‟s-Q ratio: (Market value of equity as on last day of the financial year+ book value of Total 
Debt)/Book value of Total Assets 
Return on Equity (ROE): Profit after tax/ (Equity +Reserves) 
 
Key explanatory variables: 
Boardedness: Σ(1+Total number of multiple directorships held by director)/Size of the board 
 
Connectedness variables 
Degree: measures the number of links to and from a person 
Betweenness: measures the frequency a person lies on the shortest path connecting everyone else 
in the network 




Indian promoters: Total percentage of domestic promoter shareholding 
Foreign promoters: Total percentage of foreign promoter shareholding 
Government promoter: Total percentage of central and state government shareholding  
Indian Financial Institutions: Total percentage of domestic financial institution shareholding 
Foreign Financial Institutions: Total percentage of foreign financial institution shareholding 
Size: Total Assets  
Age: Years since incorporation of the firm 
Leverage: Total Debt/Total Assets 
 
Dummy variables:  
 
Industry dummies: 3 dummy variables - (a) Manufacturing (b) Services (c) Financial Services 
and Banks 








Appendix 2: Clause 49 implementation time line 


















Panel A: Director Interlocks and ROE (Fixed Effects Models) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROE). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 
represented in parenthesis below the respective coefficients. The asterisks *, **, *** represent p values of < 0.10, < 0.05, and 
<0.01 respectively.  
 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0239*** 
(0.0073) 
        0.0199** 
(0.0098) 
Degree      0.0011 
(0.0008) 




Betweenness        0.0000* 
(0.0000) 










R squared  0.1218  0.1340  0.1243  0.1252  0.1291  0.1308  0.1356 
 
F-statistic  6.19***  6.52***  5.97***  6.03***  6.24***  5.68***  5.63*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
947  947  946  947  947  946  946 80 
 
 
Panel B: Director Interlocks and ROE (Random Effects Models) 
The table below depicts the regression output of director Boardedness and connectedness variables on Return on Assets (ROE). The 
Models (1) to (7) represent fixed effects models. Model (1) represents the base model with just controls. Models (2) to (5) represent 
director Boardedness and connectedness variables introduced separately into the base model. Models (6) and (7) represent the global 
models with all key explanatory variables estimated simultaneously. Model (6) takes all connectedness variables together while 
Model  (7)  estimates  all  connectedness  and  Boardedness  variables  simultaneously.  All  models  include  an  intercept,  industry 
dummies and year dummies but these are not reported. All variables are as defined in the appendix 1. The standard errors are 
represented in parenthesis below the respective coefficients. The asterisks *, **, *** represent p values of < 0.10, < 0.05, and 
<0.01 respectively.  
 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 






















































































































Industry dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Year dummies  Included  Included   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
Boardedness    0.0190*** 
(0.0056) 
        0.0077 
(0.0087) 
Degree      0.0018*** 
(0.0006) 




Betweenness        0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 














129.38***  142.49***  138.05***  137.69***  142.44***  144.98***  145.87*** 
 
Number of  firm-
year observations 
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